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I. STATEMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS' JURISDICTION 
Under Utah Code Annotated, section 78-2A-3 (1989), the Utah 
Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this case. 
Section 73-2A-3(h) and Utah Court of Appeals Rules 3 and 4 
furnish the Court with authority in final orders involving 
domestic relations, including child support. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case concerns an order filed by Judge Scott Daniels, 
modifying the parties1 Divorce Decree. The order centers on 
Appellant's request, on January 19, 1988 and amended on May 2, 
1988, that Ms. Allred pay additional child support and carry two 
of the children on her medical insurance. 
On May 5, 1989, following two hearings, the court ordered 
Ms. Allred to pay child support and Mr. Allred to provide medical 
insurance coverage. Mr. Allred filed a Notice of Appeal on May 
11, 1989. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court make adequate findings of fact 
supporting its order? Can Mr. Allred challenge the trial court's 
findings as inadequate when he approved of the court's decision, 
drafted the findings, and did not object to them as inadequate at 
the second hearing? 
2. Did the trial court err in requiring Mr. Allred to 
carry the two minor children on his insurance policy when Ms. 
1 
Allred's employer does not allow employees to carry insurance for 
anyone who is not claimed as a tax deduction? 
3. Did the trial court err in awarding $100 per month 
child support for Corey Allred after Mr. Allred had stipulated to 
$100 per month child support for Derek Allred, and when Corey 
came to live with him, had reduced owed monthly child support by 
$100? 
4. Did the trial court err in requiring Corey's child's 
support to be placed in an interest-bearing account, after 
finding that as satisfaction for past child support owed to Ms. 
Allred, the court had ordered Mr. Allred to set up similar 
accounts for two of the children, but, he never complied? 
5. Did the trial court err in ordering that the interest-
bearing account be paid to Corey Allred after his eighteenth 
birthday, when Mr. Allred had agreed, and does not object, that 
child support be paid to Derek Allred after his eighteenth 
birthday? 
6. Did the trial court err in considering, as a layperson, 
Ms. Allred's formal objections fourteen days after Mr. Allred 
served the findings of fact and conclusions of law, when Ms. 
Allred had earlier written to the court, and Mr. Allred, 
concerning her objections and asking to be informed if a motion 
was required? 
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IV, Determinative Statutes 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) Findings by 
the Court: 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for 
finds are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered 
as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated 
orally and recorded in open court following the close 
of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum 
of decision filed by the court. The trial court need 
not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56 and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(Emphasis added). 
2. utah Code Annotated, section 78-45-7(3) (1989). 
Determination of amount of support — Rebuttable guidelines: 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut 
the guidelines, the court shall establish support after 
considering all relevant factors including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living 
the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income i • • .* 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, 
and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; 
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(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others. 
(Emphasis added). 
3. Utah Code Annotated, section 78-45-7.2(1)(a) (1989). 
Application of guidelines — Rebuttal: 
(1)(a) The guidelines apply to any judicial or 
administrative order establishing or modifying an award 
of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(Emphasis added). 
4. Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-904(2)(A) Child 
Support Guidelines: 
(2) Application of guidelines. 
(A) The guidelines are advisory to the court. 
Final orders in all cases shall be made at 
the discretion of the court based upon the 
facts of the individual case. 
(Emphasis added)• 
4. Utah Code Annotated, section 15-2-1 (1989). Period of 
minority. 
The period of minority extends in males and 
females to the age of eighteen years; but all minors 
obtain their majority by marriage. It is further 
provided that courts in divorce actions may order 
support to age 21. 
(Emphasis added). 
5. Utah Code Annotated, section 30-3-5(3) (1989). ... Court 
to have continuing jurisdiction ....: 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maint4enance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(Emphasis added). 
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V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case concerns a change in the custody -f Corey Allred. 
After Corey began living with his father, Appel * Franklin 
Allred, Mr. Allred filed a Motion for Modification of the Divorce 
Decree, Mi; , Allred sought child support of approximately $250, 
and also, by amendment, that Ms. Allred carry both Corey and an 
older son, Derek, on her medical insurance. 
Ms. Allred con tested the amount of child support requested. 
She also opposed including the children on her medical insurance. 
B... Course of the Proceedings 
Mr. Allred f i 1 ed a Mo11on f or Mod I f i cat Ion o £ the D :i vorce 
Decree on January 19, 1988, requesting a change in custody for 
Corey Al lred. On March 1, 1 9 8 8 Ms All red responded, pro se, 
opposing the custody change and counter pet it i oned for unpaid 
child support. Mr. Allred answered Ms. Allred's counter-
pet iti< larch 3, 1988. Judge Scott Daniels, of the Third 
Judicial District Court, heard the Motion on March ] 8, .1 9 88 and 
granted Mr. Allred temporary custody. A t that time Judge 
Daniels nnief t-;d a custody evaluation and continued the matter for 
trial. 
On May 2, 1988, Mr Allred moved to amend his motion to 
includes claims for insurance coverage and medical benefits. Ms. 
Allred filed objections on May 16, 19 8 8, The cour t heard the 
custody issue on October 7, 1988 and Ms. Allred agreed not to 
oppose cue transfer1 of Corey's custody to Mr. Allred. 
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Judge Daniels heard the child support and insurance coverage 
issues on December 21, 1988. On January 5, 1989, Mr. Allred 
prepared proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Ms. 
Allred filed objections on January 24, 1989. The court ordered a 
second hearing, to be held on March 10, 1989. Following the 
hearing Judge Daniels issued an order on May 5, 1989 resolving 
the insurance coverage, medical costs, unpaid child support, and 
child support issues. Mr. Allred appealed on May 11, 1989. 
C. Trial Court's Disposition 
The trial court ordered that the child support owed to Ms. 
Allred be setoff against medical costs and child support owed to 
Mr. Allred. It further awarded Mr. Allred $100 monthly child 
support. Finally, the court order requires Ms. Allred to place 
the $100 monthly payments into an interest-bearing account, not 
to be withdrawn without court order. 
D. Relevant Facts 
In August 1980, Gaydi Allred filed for divorce from John 
Franklin Allred. After almost a year long bitter custody battle 
the court granted Ms. Allred the divorce, custody of the three 
children, and child support. Ms. Allred retained custody of all 
three children for more than five years. 
In 1986, the parties modified the divorce decree, exchanging 
custody of the second child, Derek, after he began living with 
Mr. Allred. (December 21, 1988 Transcript at 11). In connection 
with Derek's custody change, Mr. Allred stipulated to Ms. Allred 
providing $100 monthly child support. Id. at 3. Furthermore, 
6 
Mr • Allred a Iso received the right, to claim both Corey and Derek: 
as deductions, IcL at 10-11, 
After Mr. Allred refused to make current overdue child 
support payments on the other two '.\hi idiren, My «\Jlre htamed a 
thousand dollar judgment against him, id. at 8. November 
1987, following a motion set: aside the judgment, Mr. Allred 
agreed to satisfy the $l,00w debt by: 
immediately placing $500 into an interest-bearing 
account in the name of each child in [Ms. Allred1 s] 
custody, Aaryn and Corey Allred, with herself as 
trustee and with each child to receive the contents of 
the account when he or she reaches the age of 18 years. 
Id. at 33 In spite of a court order containing this agreement, 
Mr. AJ i L eo never com pi i ec* I,d. at 34. 
Late in 1987, the youngest child, Corey, also began residing 
with Mr Allred. Consequently, through reducing the child 
suppor t amount he owed to Ms. Al 3 red for the ol dest child, Mr. ' 
Allred accepted additional $100 monthly child support payments 
from Ms. Allred. Id. at 4, Thus, for each of the younger two 
children, Derek and Corey, Mr Al ] re> :i accepted $.1 00 pen month I n 
child support. 
The court conducted a hearing concerning Coreyfs custody, 
insurance coverage, medical costs, and unpaid child, support: on 
December 21, 1988 Both Mr. Allred, an attorney, and Ms. Allred, 
ayperson, appeared pro se. At that time, the court considered 
evidence on both parties' insurance policies. Id, »it 2 5-2R. Ms. 
Allred explained that her employer would not allow her to insure 
Derek and lliorey because she could not claim them as deductions. 
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Id. at 25. After hearing all of this evidence, the court found 
Ms. Allred's insurance inadequate, terming it "... not a very 
good plan." Id. 
The court also considered the standard of living and 
situation of the parties. Thus, for example, the court heard Ms. 
Allred testify about the children's "educational, surgical, 
psychological, dental, orthodontic, child care, and 
extracurricular expenses while they resided with [her]." Id. at 
15. She explained that she had provided these items and raised 
all three children on $33,000 a year. Id. at 31. Ms. Allred 
further testified concerning her inability to provide outings for 
Corey, and meals and movies for his friends should she be 
required to pay child support. Id. at 16-17. Legal fees had 
cost Ms. Allred more than $13,000, for which she was still making 
monthly payments. Id. at 14. 
Mr. Allred testified about the cost he incurs for Derek's 
psychiatrists, and Corey's medical treatment for asthma. Id. at 
18-20. In addition, he reported that he owned income property in 
Tooele, Utah. Id. at 23. Mr. Allred stated that his obligations 
had increased, and that he liquidated his Keogh plan. Id. at 22-
23. Mr. Allred also described his legal practice, DUI defense, 
and its deterioration due to a change in the law. Id. at 32-33. 
In addition to standard of living and situation, the court 
also considered the wealth and income of the parties. Ms. Allred 
testified that her income was $29,000. Id. at 17. Mr. Allred 
testified that his total income for that year reached $171,000. 
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Id. at 24. He estimated that his income for 1988 would be 
$80,000 Id. 
Regarding the parties1 ability to earn, Ms. Allred testified 
that her past earnings had been between $18,000 to $20,000 per 
year. Id. at 31. Moreover, the court found that although Mr. 
Allred1s legal practice was suffering, he could "get into 
something else and make a lot of money." March 10, 1989 Hearing, 
Transcript at 10. 
The court acknowledged the need of the parties, and in 
particular of the child, Corey. Thus, for example, the court 
found that Ms. Allred should pay some child support. December 
21, 1988 Transcript at 34; March 10, 1989 Transcript at 23. The 
court further found that although Mr. Allred supported the second 
child, Derek, Mr. Allred did not need the child support to raise 
both of the boys. March 10, 1988 Transcript at 24. Thus, the 
court concluded that the best interests of Corey would be served 
by creating an interest-bearing account with the child support 
payments to be used for his education. Id. at 24. 
Mr. Allred approved of the court's award of $100 month child 
support payments: 
THE COURT: Okay. That's a good way to do it. 
That will be the order. No more child support will be 
required for Derek, but beginning in January of '89, 
$100 a month will be required for Corey until Corey 
reaches his 18th birthday. 
MR. ALLRED: Perfect. 
December 21, 1988 Transcript at 36. Mr. Allred then drafted the 
court's findings. Id. at 36. 
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On December 28, 1988, Ms. Allred discussed with Mr. Allred, 
by letter, the possibility of using the child support payments to 
create an interest-bearing account for Coreyfs education. 
Exhibit A, Addendum. On January 2, 1989, Ms. Allred informed the 
court of her proposal for an interest-bearing account. Being 
unrepresented by legal counsel, Ms. Allred asked the court to 
inform her if she needed to file a formal motion of some kind. 
Exhibit B, Addendum. 
Mr. Allred mailed Ms. Allred a copy of the courtfs proposed 
findings on January 6, 1989, however, she did not receive them 
until January 15, 1989. She immediately wrote to the court 
requesting additional time for a response. Exhibit C, Addendum. 
Ms. Allred filed her objections to the proposed order on January 
24, 1989. 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court's findings of fact, granting Mr. Allred 
$100 monthly child support should be upheld because they are not 
clearly erroneous. 
2. The trial court entered adequate findings of fact to 
support the $100 monthly child support payments, the insurance 
coverage, and the interest-bearing account. 
3. The court properly considered Ms. Allredfs proposal to 
place the child support payments into an interest-bearing 
account. 
10 
VII, DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
A, The trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous 
and therefore should not be disturbed. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52, clearly state 
that a trial court's findings of fact "shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous." In interpreting this standard of 
review, the Utah State Supreme Court stated: "On appeal of a 
judgment from the bench, after trial, we defer to the trial 
court's factual assessment unless there is clear error." Copper 
State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 
88, 93 (Utah 1988). 
A "clearly erroneous" finding exists when "although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed." United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (quoted in State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Thus, "[t]he mere fact that on 
the same evidence the appellate court might have reached a 
different result does not justify it in setting the findings 
aside." Walker, 743 P.2d at 193 (quoting Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure section 2585). 
Furthermore, in determining whether the court has made a 
mistake, and whether the evidence supports the court's decision, 
the reviewing court must "presume the findings of fact of the 
trial court to be correct." Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 462 
(Utah App. 1987). See also Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 106 
(Utah 1984) ("On review of questions of fact, this Court views 
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the evidence and all the inferences that can reasonably be drawn 
therefrom in a light most supportive of the trial court's 
findings.") . 
In particular, the trial court's decisions relating to 
financial apportionment in a divorce should be upheld. See e.g., 
Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah App. 1989) (ff[W]e 
defer to the trial court's modification of a child support award. 
We will not upset the trial court's apportionment of financial 
responsibilities in the absence of manifest injustice or inequity 
that indicates a clear abuse of discretion."); Canning v. 
Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 327 (Utah App. 1987) ("The monthly $50 
difference between what she requested and what she received can 
hardly be characterized as an abuse of discretion. We will not 
second-guess the award."); Hansen v. Hansen. 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 
(Utah App.) ("The trial court is permitted considerable 
discretion in adjusting the financial interests of the parties to 
a divorce, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of 
validity."), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, the trial court's findings of facts are not 
clearly erroneous. The record reveals that the court considered 
numerous factors in determining the child support award and 
insurance coverage. Repeatedly, Judge Daniels inquired about 
parties' insurance policies and premiums. See December 21, 1988 
Hearing, Transcript at 25-28; March 10, 1989 Hearing, Transcript 
at 10-12. Furthermore, the court had before it information 
concerning the parties' incomes, debts, past history of 
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agreements and payments, children's medical expenses, and desires 
for the children's future. See Part V.D., Relevant Facts, supra. 
Based upon all of this information, the court decided to 
award Mr. Allred $100 monthly child support, to be placed in an 
interest-bearing account, and require him to pay the insurance 
coverage. The trial court's decision does not exhibit "manifest 
injustice or inequity" indicating "a clear abuse of discretion." 
B. The trial court entered adequate findings of fact to support 
the $100 monthly child support payments, the insurance 
coverage, and the interest-bearing account. 
Appellant, Mr. Allred, argues that the court's decision must 
be reversed and remanded because it (1) did not enter adequate 
findings of fact, and therefore, (2) failed to justify a 
departure from the advisory guidelines. This argument ignores 
the relevant statutes and the plain discussion on the record. 
As Appellant notes, when a trial court fails to make 
findings of fact, the case must be reversed. See e.g. . Bake v. 
Bake, 772 F.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1989); Jefferies v. Jefferies, 
752 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah App. 1988). These findings, however, 
include those written, and those orally made. Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on 
oral or documentary evidence ....") (emphasis added). See Erwin 
v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1989) ("[T]he findings may 
be expressed orally from the bench or contained in other 
documents . . . . " ) ; Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 
APP-) ("[Rule 52(a) now explicitly authorizes us to look beyond 
the written findings of fact to the trial record and and evaluate 
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the sufficiency of the judge's oral findings ....") cert, denied. 
765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
Furthermore, the court's findings, when based upon 
sufficient evidence in the record, may be expressed generally. 
See e.g., Pearson v. Pearson. 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977) 
("[F]indings of fact and conclusions of law will support a 
judgment, though they are very general .... Findings should be 
limited to the ultimate facts and if they ascertain ultimate 
facts, and sufficiently conform to the pleadings and the evidence 
to support the judgment, they will be regarded as sufficient, 
though not as full and as complete as might be desired."); 
Sorenson v. Beers. 614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 1980) (H[T]he trial 
court's finding, although conclusory in nature ... is 
sufficient."); Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App. 
1987) (quoting Pearson with approval). 
In arriving at findings in a child support case, the court 
should consider the relevant statutory factors. Utah Code 
Annotated, section 78-45-7(3)(1989); Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461, 
466 (Utah App. 1989), Jefferies v. Jefferies. 752 P.2d 909, 911 
(Utah App. 1988). 
In this case, the trial court sufficiently complied with 
these procedures. It made findings, both oral and written, 
concerning the ultimate facts. And, as a consequence, the court 
concluded that Ms. Allred must pay monthly child support for 
Corey (Conclusions of Law, #1) ; that these monthly child support 
payments should be $100 (Conclusions of Law, #3); that Mr. Allred 
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must provide insurance coverage (Conclusions of law #5); and that 
the $100 payments should be put into an interest bearing account, 
not to be withdrawn without court order (Order, May 5, 1989). 
Furthermore, the court based all of its findings and conclusions 
upon the factors enumerated in section 78-45-7. 
Specifically, as detailed in section VI.D., supra, the court 
considered the standard of living and situation of the parties. 
It examined the types of activities, debts, and obligations of 
both parties. December 21, 1988 Hearing, Transcript at 14-20, 
22-23, 31-33. In addition, the court heard the parties testify 
as to their wealth and income. Id. at 17 and 24. The court also 
noted that Mr. Allred bears the support for two minor children. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, #2. Relating to the 
parties ability to earn, the court considered Ms. Allred past 
earnings, and observed that Mr. Allred could "make a lot of 
money." March 10, 1989 Hearing, Transcript at 10. Even with his 
current income, the court noted that Mr. Allred did not need the 
child support. Id. at 24 
Of particular importance, moreover, the court considered the 
need of the child. Recently, the Utah legislature explicitly 
provided that a child's need must be considered in determining 
child support. A fact which Appellant apparently overlooked in 
quoting section 78-45-7. While the litigation over who should 
pay what, and how, may become petty at times, the trial court in 
this case recognized that the child's need is paramount. 
Accordingly, because Mr. Allred did not need the money, the trial 
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court found that the opportunity provided by the interest bearing 
account, to go to college, would be "a good thing" for Corey. 
March 10, 1989 Hearing, Transcript at 24. 
Section 78-45-7 does not limit the court to the enumerated 
factors. And, in this case, the court did consider additional 
points such as, Mr. Allred's stipulation to accept $100 per month 
for Derek. December 21, 1988 Hearing, Transcript at 3. 
Moreover, when Corey came to live with him, Mr. Allred reduced 
his monthly child support obligation to Ms. Allred by $100. Id. 
at 4. And, Mr. Allred received income tax deductions for both 
boys. Id. at 10-11. In addition, Mr. Allred broke his agreement 
to set up similar, interest bearing accounts for two of the 
children. Id. at 33-34. Furthermore, Mr. Allred has never 
contributed to the oldest child's college education, and has 
expressed reluctance to contribute to Derek's college education. 
March 10, 1989 Hearing Transcript at 16 and 20. Likewise the 
court considered the parties insurance policies and premiums, 
including the fact that Ms. Allred could not obtain insurance for 
the children through her employer, since she did not claim them 
as deductions. December 21, 1989 Hearing, Transcript at 25-28. 
Clearly, the court had before it ample evidence supporting its 
decision. And, although the findings may have been expressed 
generally, the Utah Supreme Court has determined that to be 
sufficient. See Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 
1977) . 
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Ironically, Appellant now argues that the court made 
inadequate findings of fact supporting the $100 monthly payment 
even though he had characterized the decision as "perfect" and 
had drafted the proposed findings, December 21, 1988 Hearing, 
Transcript at 36. Consequently, Appellant's argument lacks 
merit. See Pearson v. Pearson. 561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977). 
In Pearson, the Utah Supreme Court refused to reverse the 
trial court's decision even though "the Findings are not 
comprehensive." Id. at 1082. Furthermore, the court noted that 
the decision should be particularly upheld because of 
"appellant's concession that the property division was not uniust 
or inequitable ...." Id. (emphasis in original). Similarly, in 
this case, Appellant's agreement with the trial court and his 
drafting of the proposed findings, undermines his argument that 
the findings are inadequate.1 
Appellant further argues that the court should not have 
departed from the statutory child support guidelines. However, 
as the Appellant well recognizes, the court has complete 
discretion whether or not to adopt the guidelines. See Code of 
1
 The cases upon which Appellant relies simply do not apply 
to the circumstances here. Thus, unlike this case, in Bake 
v.Bake, 772 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1989) the trial court failed to 
consider any of the factors listed in section 78-45-7. 
Similarly, in Johnson v. Johnson. Ill P.2d 696 (Utah App. 1989) 
the trial court made no finding on the parties' economic 
circumstances. Finally, in Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 
(Utah App. 1988) the parties failed to provide adequate financial 
information. Furthermore, the appellate court limited its 
holding to support involving an adult child. Id. at 911. And, 
in none of these cases did the appellant approve of the findings 
as is the case here. 
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Judicial Administration, Rule 4-904(2)(A) ("The guidelines are 
advisory to the court, Final orders in all cases shall be made 
at the discretion of the court based upon the facts of the 
individual case."); Utah Code Annotated, section 78-45-7.2(1)(a) 
("The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order 
establishing or modifying an award of child support entered on or 
after July 1, 1989.'M (emphasis added); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App. 1989) ("The guideline might have some 
probative value, but should not be controlling."). 
Finally, because the trial court clearly made adequate 
findings of fact, perhaps Appellant actually is arguing that the 
findings do not support the decision. As noted above, in Section 
VILA., the trial court's decision must be upheld unless clearly 
erroneous, decidedly not the case here. Furthermore, Appellant 
has failed to meet the "heavy burden" entailed in such an 
argument. Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale. 776 P.2d 643, 
646 (Utah App. 1989) . In a recent divorce case, the Utah Court 
of Appeals outlined the requirements for challenging a court's 
findings of fact: 
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's 
factual findings, an appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the findings, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings, or that its 
findings are otherwise clearly erroneous. 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah App. 1989) 
(citation omitted). See also, Fitzgerald v. Critchfield. 744 
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P.2d 301, 304 (Utah App. 1987) (appellant's burden "neither 
elective nor optional"). 
C. The court properly considered Ms, Allred's proposal to 
place the child support payments into an interest-
bearing account. 
Appellant, Mr. Allred, argues that the trial court erred in 
ruling that the $100 monthly child support be placed in a trust 
account for Corey's education. He bases this argument on two 
reasons: (1) the court did not make findings of special or 
unusual circumstances justifying support after Corey's eighteenth 
birthday; and (2) the court was without jurisdiction to modify 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law to include the 
interest bearing account. 
Appellant's arguments lack merit for three reasons. First, 
neither the transcripts of the hearings nor the court order 
indicate that the child support payments must necessarily extend 
beyond Corey's eighteenth birthday. Second, Appellant fails to 
mention that he expressly agreed that the support payments 
continue after both Derek's and Corey's eighteenth birthdays. 
And, third, Ms. Allred, as a layperson, had timely informed the 
court and Appellant of her desire to create the account. 
Appellant assumes that the interest bearing account provides 
support after Corey's eighteenth birthday. However, Ms. Allred's 
and the court's statements -that the account would provide Corey 
"an opportunity to have a little money to go to college" 
furnishes the only evidence supporting this belief. And, even 
these statements don't compel support past age eighteen. Thus, 
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Corey could graduate from high school and begin attending college 
earlier. Consequently, the child support payments need not 
necessarily extend beyond age eighteen. Moreover, the court 
order does not even target college education as the reason for 
the interest bearing account. Rather the order merely states 
that the payments should be placed in an interest bearing 
account, "not to be withdrawn without court order." Order on May 
5, 1989. Furthermore, even if the support could be characterized 
as extending past age eighteen, the court has discretion to so 
order. 
Under Utah Code Annotated, section 15-2-1, a court may order 
in a divorce action that child support continue to age 21. See 
e.g. , Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1978) ("Under 
UCA, section 15-2-1 (1953), as amended the trial court has 
discretion in deciding whether or not to order support to 
continue after age 18." (citing cases in n.l)). The court's 
discretion to continue child support past age eighteen includes 
any child, depending on the circumstances. Jackman v. Jackman, 
696 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah 1985) (trial court must consider any 
evidence on appropriateness of child support past age eighteen, 
discretion not limited to those with a particular handicap). 
In this case, the trial court had before it several special 
circumstances justifying Corey receiving the child support for 
his future education. First, the court found that Appellant did 
not need the child support payments to raise Corey. March 10, 
1989 Hearing, Transcript at 24. Second, Appellant had agreed to 
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create two similar interest bearing accounts. In spite of this 
stipulation, and a court order further requiring him to do so, 
Appellant never established the accounts. Id. at 23-24; December 
21, 1988 Hearing, Transcript at 33-34. Third, the record 
demonstrates that Appellant has consistently ignored his 
children's interest in college. The oldest child, Aaryn, 
receives no assistance from Appellant for her college education. 
March 10, 1989 Hearing, Transcript at 16. And, Appellant 
expressed reluctance to support Derek's education. Id. at 20. 
Finally, Appellant had agreed that both Derek's and Corey's 
support should continue past age eighteen. 
At the December 21, 1988 Hearing, the court twice stated 
that Corey's child support payments should continue only until 
his eighteenth birthday. Transcript at 35 and 36. However, when 
Appellant drafted the proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, he reworded the court's finding to state: "[Ms. Allred] 
should pay to [Appellant] the sum of $100 per month ... until 
such time as the minor child Corey Allred obtains the age of 18 
years and completes high school.ff Exhibit A, Appellants Brief 
(emphasis added). Appellant's proposed findings further required 
Ms. Allred to pay child support for Derek through high school 
graduation. Id. When Ms. Allred objected to this latter finding 
as extending beyond Derek's eighteenth birthday, Appellant 
successfully argued that the finding should stand. In other 
words, Appellant essentially stipulated that Derek's child 
support payments would stretch beyond age eighteen. Therefore, 
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Appellant cannot now be heard to complain that Corey's support 
would also continue past age eighteen. Cf. , Despain v. Despain. 
627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981). 
In Despain, as in this case, the husband agreed that child 
support should continue beyond majority. Id. at 526. Later, he 
argued, as Appellant argues here, that no special or unusual 
circumstances existed warranting the extended support. Id. at 
527. The trial court disagreed and ordered payment to continue. 
On appeal, the husband argued that the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to continue support beyond age twenty-one. In 
rejecting this argument, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the right 
of the parties to agree on support continuing beyond the child's 
majority. Id. Likewise, Appellant in this case has agreed that 
support should continue beyond Corey's eighteenth birthday.2 
Finally, as in the Despain case, Appellant argues that the 
court lacked jurisdiction to modify the findings of fact and 
conclusion of law. However, as the Despain court noted: 
A husband, who has undertaken an obligation in 
consideration of the provisions of the property 
2
 Cases cited by Appellant in support of his argument that 
payments in this case cannot reach beyond age eighteen can 
readily be distinguished. In Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435 
(Utah 1978) the court did not consider special or unusual 
circumstances. Indeed, as Appellant admits, the trial court 
merely mistook when majority occurs. In this case, it is not at 
all clear that the court has ordered support beyond age eighteen. 
Furthermore, even if so ordered, the decision to extend support 
arises not only from the trial court's order, but also from 
Appellant's agreement. Again, in Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 
P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988), the court did not have before it an 
agreement by the parties to continue support beyond eighteen. In 
addition, the court's award there, and in English v. English, 565 
P.2d 409 (Utah 1977) both encompassed a permanent benefit. 
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settlement agreement which were for his benefit, cannot 
subsequently complain that the court, in the absence of 
such agreement, would have been without power to order 
him to do so. 
Id. Admittedly, the facts in Despain differ from those here. 
The husband in Despain paid child support, and Appellant receives 
it. However, the principle remains the same. A husband who 
agrees that support should continue past majority, cannot later 
complain that the court lacks jurisdiction to order the same. 
See also, Utah Code Annotated, section 30-3-5(3) (1989) ("The 
court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for ... children and their support . . . . " ) ; Myers v. 
Myers
 f 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App. 1989) (stipulation 
incorporated into decree was subject to continuing jurisdiction 
of court and could be modified); Balls v. Hackley, 745 P.2d 836, 
838 (Utah App. 1987) ("The terms of the stipulation thereby fall 
under the continuing jurisdiction of the court in divorce 
actions."). 
Moreover, Appellant's argument that the court lacked 
jurisdiction because Ms. Allred did not file her formal 
objections within the allotted time also lacks merit. As 
Appellant states, he mailed his proposed findings on January 5, 
1989. Ms. Allred mailed her objections on January 24, 1989. 
And, Rule 4-504 requires objections to be submitted within five 
days after service. Appellant's Brief at 17. 
Contrary to Appellant's contention (Id.), however, Ms. 
Allred did more than file handwritten objections fourteen days 
late. Appellant fails to mention that Ms. Allred informed him of 
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her desire, that an interest bearing account be established, with 
a letter dated December 28, 1988. Exhibit A, Addendum. In 
addition, Ms. Allred sent the court a letter, and Appellant a 
copy, with the same suggestion on January 2, 1989. Exhibit B, 
Addendum. At that time, Ms. Allred advised the court that she 
was unrepresented by legal counsel and asked that she be notified 
if she needed to file a formal motion. Id. Finally, although 
Appellant served his proposed findings on January 5, 1989, Ms. 
Allred did not receive them until January 15, 1989. She then 
immediately wrote the court and asked for an extension of time to 
file objections. Exhibit C, Addendum. 
As the Utah Supreme Court recognizes, a layman acting as her 
own attorney should be given considerable deference. See e.g., 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) (f,[W]e have 
also cautioned that 'because of his lack of technical knowledge 
of law and procedure [a layman acting as his own attorney] should 
be accorded every consideration that may reasonably be 
indulged. Ml) (quoting Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 
1962)). In this case, Ms. Allred acted promptly upon actual 
receipt of the proposed findings. In addition, she had already 
informed both the court and Appellant of her proposal. 
Furthermore, she specifically requested to be notified if a 
motion was required. In pursuit of Corey's best interest, the 
court used its equitable powers to consider Ms. Allred's 
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suggestion. Accordingly, Appellant's argument that the court 
lacks jurisdiction must fail.3 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings of fact and conclusion of law 
must not be disturbed absent clear error. Clear error does not 
exist in this case because the court entered adequate findings 
which support its judgment. In addition, the court's equitable 
powers and concern for Corey Allred's best interest provided 
adequate jurisdiction. Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals 
should affirm the trial court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of December, 1989. 
Vicki Rinne 
Attorney for Respondent 
3
 Appellant cites Crofts v. Crofts, 445 P. 2d 701 (Utah 
1968) in support of his contention that the court lacked 
jurisdiction. However in Crofts, the request to "interpret" the 
decree came three years after the court's final judgment. 
Furthermore, even then, the Supreme Court allowed some of the 
trial court's findings to stand. Id. at 703. Moreover, the 
court explicitly recognized that an order may be modified upon a 
showing of good cause. Id. In this case, the trial court 
specifically stated that the order's modification was based upon 
good cause. March 10, 1989 Hearing, Transcript at 24. 
Appellant also cites Winn v. Winn, 651 P.2d 51 (Montana 
1982). However, Appellant provides no reason why a Montana case, 
based upon Montana's Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to Utah 
law. Finally, Appellant cites Burgess v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 
(Utah 1982) and Richards v. Siddowav, 471 P.2d 143 (Utah 1970). 
Burgess, however, concerned a libel action and Richards involved 
the ownership of land. Neither case related to domestic 
relations and thus, the court's continuing jurisdiction under 
section 30-3-5 did not apply. 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of 
this brief to counsel for the Appellant, Randall Gaither, at 321 
South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 on December 16, 1989. 
Dated this 16 day of December, 1989. 
JAfiM^ f^ k: 
Vicki Rinne 
Attorney for Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
This brief contains the following attachments: 
1. Exhibit A, December 28, 1988 letter to John Franklin Allred. 
2. Exhibit B, January 2, 1989 letter to Judge Scott Daniels. 
3. Exhibit C, January 17, 1989 request for extension of time. 
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